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The Doctrine of Balance 
Kenneth L. Marcus* 
Five characteristics separate political indoctrination from the sphere of 
academic freedom: non-educativeness, controversy, extraneousness, 
imbalance, and bias.1  These five traits reflect the notion that academic 
freedom protects a uniquely academic function which defines its scope, 
justifies its privileges, strengthens its defense, and limits its applicability.  
Stanley Fish, in his important new book, provides useful tools for 
understanding why some people support such standards and others do not.  
Despite its admirable lucidity, however, Fish’s book succumbs to the facile 
argumentation that has characterized discussions of the politically trickiest 
of the five, i.e., imbalance.2 
The doctrine of “balance” provides that academic instruction must 
provide due consideration of varying views of any subject matter.  
Imbalance is an attribute of political advocacy and indoctrination, both of 
which have their proper place, which is not in the classroom.  The balance 
doctrine provides that when practitioners of a particular discipline are 
divided among multiple approaches, each of which enjoys some academic 
legitimacy, students should be exposed to the primary established 
approaches and provided the analytical skills necessary to navigate among 
them.  Thus, for example, students should be taught both Keynesianism and 
monetarism if both theories garner respect among a significant number of 
economists. Students are disserved when given only one approach. 
While simple in theory, the doctrine is complex in application.  There 
are easy cases.  Holocaust denial is so unscholarly that it may properly be 
ignored.  But there are harder cases too.  For example, some think it 
obvious that intelligent design is so discredited that it may properly be 
ignored.  Others disagree.  The same could be said, for example, of Marxian 
economics and deconstructionist literary theory.  The scholarship of 
academic freedom could be advanced by a careful elucidation of the ways 
in which the academic enterprise requires balance and those in which it 
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does not. 
Rather than confronting such difficult questions, however, Fish resorts 
to the conventional dodges.  One technique is to “Horowitz” the issue.  That 
is to say, one can taint the very idea of balance by reminding readers that 
conservative bugaboo David Horowitz supports it.  Fish proves especially 
adept at this technique, assailing even Judith Butler for too closely 
resembling Horowitz in this respect.  Fish goes further, scaring liberal 
readers with the prospect that the doctrine of balance requires affirmative 
action for right-wingers.  The very idea of balance could apparently open 
the academic floodgates to the hiring of conservatives. 
This ad hominem argument is followed by a straw man.  Fish argues 
that balance is “a bad idea” by trotting out two bad versions of it.  In one 
version, instructors would be required to teach every possible reading of, 
say, King Lear or the Reform Bill of 1832.  In the other, instructors must 
assign both conservative and liberal interpretations of the two texts.  These 
are bad versions for the reasons that Fish gives.  Instructors must have 
leeway to select a manageable number of interpretations, rather than being 
required to teach every idea that has been voiced.  Selecting instructional 
materials based solely on the political orientations of their authors unduly 
emphasizes partisan politics.  But this does not prove, as a successful 
refutation of balance must, that instructors may properly ignore any 
interpretations of Lear but their own, or exclude any readings that deviate 
from their own political perspectives.  Fish successfully refutes his own 
ideas of balance, but he does not lay a glove on the doctrine itself. 
 
